Colonel Joseph H. Alexander’s Closing In: Marines in the Seizure of Iwo Jima opens not with the iconic flag-raising but with the grim reality of 4 March 1945, when assault elements of three Marine divisions were “exhausted, their combat efficiency reduced to dangerously low levels.” The catalog subjects—United States Marine Corps history and the Battle of Iwo Jima—accurately frame the work, but the excerpts reveal a narrower focus: the operational and tactical challenges of seizing a heavily fortified island. Alexander, a retired Marine colonel, writes from an insider’s perspective, emphasizing command decisions, logistical constraints, and the frustrations of supporting arms.

The Battle Beneath the Surface

The excerpts repeatedly highlight a defining feature of the Iwo Jima battle: the Japanese defenders fought from an extensive tunnel network, rarely exposing themselves. Alexander quotes Captain Fields of the 26th Marines: “The Japs weren’t on Iwo Jima, they were in Iwo Jima.” This observation is reinforced by Richard Wheeler’s description of a battlefield where one side fought “wholly above the ground and the other operating almost wholly within it.” The text notes that American aerial observers saw “thousands of figures” on one side and a seemingly deserted landscape on the other, with simultaneous troop movements in the same territory—one on the surface, one in tunnels. This subterranean warfare made traditional tactics ineffective and forced Marines to adapt.

Frustration with Supporting Arms

A recurring theme in the excerpts is the inadequacy of air support during the early drive north. Alexander reports that the 3d Marine Division complained the Navy’s assignment of “eight fighters and eight bombers on station” was “entirely inadequate,” prompting General Cates to request replacement by the Strategic Air Force. Colonel Vernon E. Megee, Air Commander Iwo Jima, blamed “those little spit-kit Navy fighters up there, trying to help, never enough, never where they should be.” The text acknowledges that effective air support was doubtful given masterful Japanese camouflage, close-quarters combat, and overloaded request nets. Later, strikes improved with heavier bombs and better response time, but the battle continued to frustrate all supporting arms because the Japanese “almost never assembled legitimate targets in the open.”

Costly Advances and Command Decisions

Alexander’s narrative is punctuated by casualty figures and command requests. By D+6 (25 February), the V Amphibious Corps had already suffered 6,845 casualties. General Schmidt made repeated requests for release of the 3d Marines, held in Expeditionary Troops reserve. The text describes small groups of Marines crossing runways with “the inescapable feeling he was alone in the middle of a gigantic bowling alley.” Tanks were invaluable but many were lost. Resupply became nearly impossible. Schmidt managed to land corps artillery—two battalions of 155mm howitzers—whose fire eased pressure, along with naval gunfire. Yet the Marines’ disappointment with air support persisted until later improvements. The excerpts show a commander grappling with attrition and resource allocation in a battle where gains were measured in yards.

Readers should note that the excerpts cover only the first two weeks of the 36-day battle, focusing on the central and southern sectors. Alexander’s account is part of a commemorative series, so it emphasizes Marine Corps operations and sacrifices. The text includes sidebars on specific weapons and units, such as the Japanese 320mm spigot mortar and the Marines’ Zippo tanks, which are not fully represented in the excerpts. For a complete picture, consult the full work, which likely extends to the bitter end and the campaign’s legacy.